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ABSTRACT 
         
The Maritime Operations Center (MOC) was designed to effectively utilize the 
planning elements of Future Operations (FOPS) to provide more rapid, accurate 
resource allocations consistent with the vision of the Commander. MOC staff 
simultaneously participate in the planning effort, while executing the current 
operation, and supporting headquarters during planning and execution. 
Frequently, an operational planning team (OPT) – a task-organized team formed 
to conduct integrated planning for a specific mission – is formed by the MOC 
because it offers the advantage of a focused group of subject matter experts 
approaching the problem in an integrated manner. However, performance 
problems may be realized with the OPT being isolated in situations that require 
the OPT to coordinate closely with the rest of the MOC. An experiment was 
conducted in which the MOC planned with either an integrated or an isolated 
planning team where the (1) FOPS team was supported by a decision aid/ 
planning tool that fosters coordination or (2) FOPS team used a planning tool with 
a reduced coordination capability. In line with the theme of this year’s symposium 
– The Evolution of C2 – this paper describes an experiment conducted to gain 




As part of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Adaptive Architectures for Command and 
Control (A2C2) program, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been conducting empirical 
research to design and analyze adaptive C2 structures for future U.S. Navy and Joint forces.  
(Diedrich, Entin, Hutchins, Hocevar, Rubineau, & MacMillan, 2003; Entin, Diedrich, Kleinman, 
Kemple, Hocevar, Rubineau, & Serfaty, 2003; Hess, Entin, Hess, Hutchins, Kemple, Kleinman, 
Hocevar, & Serfaty, 2000; Levchuk, Kleinman, Pattipati, Kemple, & Luoma, 2000; and 
Hutchins, Kemple, Kleinman, and Hocevar, 2005). Through the integration of analytical 
modeling, human-in-the-loop experimentation and computer simulation, this research has 
followed a “model-test-model-experiment” paradigm wherein models and associated simulations 
define and guide experiments, and the results from the experiments are fed back to improve and 
enhance the models.   
 
The A2C2 program has transitioned its research results to the Navy on a number of issues. The 
models were used to provide input and support to several commands regarding implementation 
of FORCENet, Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) and the Maritime Operations Center 
(MOC). For example, the A2C2 models were used by the Strategic Studies Group when 
examining ways to implement FORCENet concepts. Two organizational structures were 
designed for Carrier Group One (CARGRU-1) that were used in a one-week experiment at NPS 
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and then CARGRU-1 employed one of these structures during GLOBAL 99.  Following this 
effort, A2C2 was asked to explore the adaptive command and control (C2) construct in support 
of the newly emerging ESG concept. Based upon our interaction with ADM LeFever the A2C2 
project was asked to experiment with C2 issues related to Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). 
Based on validated results we were asked to remain involved in ESG research. 
 
In recognition of recent needs for organizational change within the Navy the A2C2 research 
program has developed a multi-disciplinary research agenda to conduct experimentation on 
issues critical to Maritime Operations Centers (MOC). Objectives for this year’s empirically-
focused research are twofold, to: (1) continue our model-based experimentation and (2) explore 
new paradigms for empirical studies of adaptive C2 architectures for MOC laboratory research. 
Our research method for this new focus area on MOC C2 structures and processes entails (i) 
identifying key C2 issues via literature and attendance at MOC events, (ii) interacting with the 
Fleet and other subject matter experts, and (iii) analysis of selected points and paths in the 
research space via A2C2 model-driven experimentation. Potential research issues and questions 
include identification and exploration of potential “trouble spots” and recommending alternative 
organizational structures and processes; adaptation and scalability across structures and 
processes; and coordination with external forces and entities/agencies including information and 
command flows in combined operations and coordination between MOCs. 
 
A MOC empirical research campaign is underway where the emphasis is on operational versus 
tactical activities, and planning versus execution. Because of its complexity, its mission to 
oversee large operations, and its dynamic structure, the MOC is an ideal organization for 
research on organizational structures, C2, and the process of mission planning. Since the MOC 
was designed to effectively integrate the planning elements of Current and Future Operations 
(COPS and FOPS) to provide more rapid and accurate resource allocations that are consistent 
with mission requirements, our first experiment focused on the MOC with emphasis on intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (Hutchins, Kemple, Kleinman, Miller, Pfeiffer, 
Weil, Horn, Puglisi, & Entin, 2009). Two alternate structures for ISR personnel were: (1) central-
ized in a stand-alone ISR cell or (2) decentralized by embedding an ISR capability into both the 
COPS and FOPS cells.  
 
Teams with an independent ISR cell were associated with more effective FOPS plans and 
exhibited a trend of higher performance across most major performance variables. Teams with an 
independent ISR cell received the highest ratings across all observer-based measures of cell 
coordination, cell orientation, cell monitoring, and quality of actions taken by cell members. 
Teams with embedded ISR reported significantly higher perceptions of social cohesion and 
mission cohesion than teams with independent ISR, and reported higher values of perceived 
teamwork process and cell efficiency. Latencies were no different between teams, cells, or FOPS 
tasks, and were not related to performance across teams/tasks/cells. On this highly-structured, 
iterative task, the advantages of team process (familiarity, cohesions, efficacy) that were gained 
by embedding ISR within FOPS and COPS were overshadowed by the ability for COPS/ISR to 
work in parallel in separate battle areas.   
 
Among the most salient scientific contributions of the A2C2 program to C2 research is the 
conduct of model-based experimentation. Analytical models are used to guide experiments via a 
priori predictions of performance and process measures across alternative C2 structures, and by 
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conducting sensitivity analyses to suggest values for design parameters so that the experiments 
are conducted in regions where the dependent variables (DVs) are sensitive to changes in the 
independent variables (IVs). Models are also used as a reference or guidepost for examining the 
DVs and collected data, primarily via model-data comparisons. For experiment MOC-1 
“optimal” resource allocation and scheduling algorithms, developed by the University of 
Connecticut were used to determine the parameters for the planning task (Mandal, Han, Pattipati, 
& Kleinman, 2010).  These included the number of assets each FOPS planner would be 
assigning, the number of tasks that these assets would need to be assigned to, and the resource 
requirements of the individual tasks. Model outputs included the optimal assignment accuracy, 
such that tasks were adjusted so that the planning exercise could indeed be attained with 85%+ 
accuracy.  In turn, this provided mission guidelines and requirements that were placed on the 
FOPS planners, as well as a way to evaluate the produced plan post-experiment.   
 
This year NPS maintained its research objective to evaluate, via empirical study, alternative C2 
concepts for the MOC at the operational level of war.  Our approach utilized model-based 
experimentation, with particular emphasis on simulator-embedded models for decision aids and 




The MOC is a distinct functionally organized element of the Maritime Headquarters which 
conducts planning, and directs, monitors, and assesses functions in support of combat across the 
full range of military operations. Current Operations (COPS) focuses on monitoring and 
assessing the execution of the commander’s intentions. Future Operations (FOPS) conducts 
operational-level planning for near-term operations.  
 
Navy strategy envisions a network of scalable maritime headquarters, with agility to transition 
between command roles, and to deploy forward command elements rapidly as needed to meet 
the requirements of the Combatant Commander. Senior Navy leaders have stated a need to 
refocus and enhance the Navy’s ability to function at the operational level of war and to train 
commanders capable of commanding at that level (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2007). MOCs 
were conceived to enable these capabilities while providing a degree of standardization among 
the maritime headquarters (MHQ with MOC CONOPs, 2007). The initial plan establishes MOCs 
for each of the numbered fleets (e.g., the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific Ocean, the sixth 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, etc.).  The emerging “Maritime Headquarters with Maritime 
Operations Centers” concept may also have a role in maritime domain awareness (MDA), a key 
concept of the Navy’s new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
(www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf).  
 
Navy Operational Planning 
Naval forces have traditionally embraced a fluid form of fighting known as maneuver warfare 
which causes surprise and confusion within the enemy ranks giving naval forces an advantage. In 
major regional conflicts, the primary warfighters (the geographic combatant commanders) are 
the supported commanders. They are responsible for carrying out national tasking as well as 
conducting and coordinating operations within their theater. Based on the magnitude of the task, 
the unified commander may need to delegate some planning to supporting and subordinate 
commands. Delegation ensures that the subordinate staffs who are most familiar with the 
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capabilities and limitations of assigned forces, are included in plan development. As a result, 
each level contributes uniquely to the plan. Like the governing operation order, the naval plan 
tests for adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability. Naval staffs are best able to determine whether 
plans developed by subordinates can accomplish the mission and be executed with available 
resources. We instantiated this hierarchical relationship between the MOC and subordinate 
forces in the experiment by having subordinate task forces as the lower entity that MOC planners 
sent their orders to. 
 
Integrated Product Teams 
An integrated product team (IPT) is a management technique employed in the private sector that 
simultaneously integrates all essential acquisition activities through the use of multidisciplinary 
teams to optimize the design, manufacturing, business, and supportability processes. The idea is 
to move away from hierarchical decision making to a process where decisions are facilitated 
across organizational structures by IPTs (DoD, 1996). The process is designed to facilitate 
decision making by making decisions and recommendations based on timely input, where an IPT 
replaces the traditional sequential review and approval process (DoD, 1999). 
 
In 1995, then Secretary of Defense mandated that the DoD perform as many acquisition 
functions as possible using IPTs. IPTs are advisory bodies to the program manager where a key 
tenet is to resolve issues and concerns at the lowest level possible, and to expeditiously escalate 
issues that need resolution at a higher level. Advantages afforded by an IPT are that they: (1) 
streamline an inefficient process; (2) take advantage of all members’ expertise and produce an 
acceptable product the first time; and (3) focus on a particular topic. Survey results indicate the 
process shortens the timeline, reduces life-cycle costs, while continuing to meet warfighter’s 
needs (while maintaining, and often increasing, quality) (DoD, 1999)  
 
The purpose of an IPT is to reach agreement on a strategy and plan by identifying and resolving 
issues early, based upon understanding issues and the rationale for the approach being used. An 
IPT relies on applying functional expertise in a team-oriented manner and understanding 
customers (command structure, doctrine, tactics, operational environment), and integrating user’s 
requirements, logistical requirements and constraints. Principles employed by IPTs stress a spirit 
of teamwork, where participants are empowered and authorized to the maximum extent possible. 
These principles include the following: (1) Each team member brings unique expertise that needs 
to be recognized by all; (2) Each person’s views are important and need to be heard; this includes 
full and open discussions, where cooperation is essential, based upon reasoned discussion; (3) A 
sense of ownership is key to success, where all must feel their contributions are important and 
are well considered, and decisions are a product of the team.   
 
Empowerment is critical, including frequent communication with their leadership. Qualified 
members must be professionals who are: (1) current in their functional area; (2) knowledgeable 
in the mission and organization they are representing; (3) trained in the use of and participation 
in IPTs. Membership should be limited to the minimum essential to enhance communication and 
trust and participation should be by principle member. IPTs should be considered when there are 
requirements for multi-functional expertise, to address multi-faceted, complex situations and 
issues. The focus is on addressing issues that require balancing cost, schedule, and performance, 




An underlying premise is that forming an IPT with members who represent the range of skills 
needed for the entire process should enable teams to consider more and a broader range of 
alternatives quickly, and in a broader context, and enables better and faster decisions. Once on a 
team, the role of an IPT member changes from that of a member of a particular functional 
organization, who focuses on a given discipline, to that of a team member, who focuses on a 
product and associated processes. 
Operational Planning Teams 
Operational Planning Teams (OPT) represent the military’s implementation of an IPT. When an 
OPT is used the focus is on an integrated approach to planning (MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps 
Planning Process). Integrated planning does not replace normal staff planning, but increases the 
staff’s participation by demanding greater planning input. Principal and special staffs must have 
representation within an OPT to ensure the warfighting functions are appropriately represented 
for integrated planning to occur. Each primary and special staff must be represented in the OPT, 
as well as all adjacent, subordinate and supporting commands, and as required, subject matter 
experts (SMEs) are added to the team.  
 
Planning by an OPT considers the warfighting functions during planning, thus eliminating many 
of the omissions that proved fatal in the past, and is better able to visualize the interactions that 
will occur in execution. For example, previously the command element would recommend a 
mission and default the planning to the Ground Control Element (GCE) who would then plan in 
a vacuum. There was the potential for no consideration of the capabilities and limitations of other 
elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) during the GCE’s planning. Now the 
Marine Corps fights and plans as a MAGTF – the OPT is at the heart of the MAGTF’s 
operational planning, supplemented by staff action and coordination. 
 
Whether for business (IPT) or military (OPT) the emphasis is on the use of an integrated 
approach during the planning process. The focus is on consideration of capabilities and 
limitations of all other elements on the process. Because they are organized to be less hierarch-
ical during planning they are able to bring all representatives together. Staff representatives must 
keep a two-way information flow going between the OPT and the staff and must avoid getting 
blind-sided by a principle staff officer during a brief to the commanding general. 
 
One result of implementation of an OPT is an increase in situation awareness throughout the 
force. Results of implementing an OPT are generally better and faster decisions. Since MAGTFs 
fight as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), the OPT is also linked to higher, adjacent, and other 
units through use of liaison officers (LNOs). Therefore, the entire plan has considered all the 
capabilities and limitations of the JTF across the warfighting functions and throughout the Joint 
Area of Operations (JOA). Everyone concerned will know the capabilities and limitations of 
logistics and the combat service support element (CSSE), which will ensure maximizing the 
combat power of the force. An OPT offers benefits that are analogous to those provided by IPTs, 
that is, all aspects of the (design) process will be represented so all these elements can be 
considered early and produce a better system or plan. 
 
An OPT is normally formed around a core of planners from either Future Plans or Future 
Operations and draws members from both FOPS and COPS. The OPT is completed with 
representatives from various other staff sections and organizations that can provide SMEs 
required to address mission requirements. An advantage of an OPT is a focused group of SMEs 
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approaching the problem in an integrated manner, however the division of responsibilities 
between the OPT and the principal, or designated staff (“battle staff”) may become confused. A 
common misconception is that an OPT is viewed as a substitute for normal staff action and 
coordination. When this occurs, the staff tends to be disengaged from the planning effort, and the 
OPT is left unsupported in terms of staff estimates and guidance. The result is that the OPT may 
be unable to develop plans that are complete, supportable, and synchronized. 
Frequently, an operational planning team – a task-organized team formed to conduct integrated 
planning for a specific mission – is formed by the MOC because it offers the advantage of a 
focused group of subject matter experts approaching the problem in an integrated manner. 
However, problems may be associated with their being somewhat isolated in situations that 
require the OPT to coordinate closely with the rest of the MOC.  The OPT small group construct 
may lead to OPT isolation from the rest of the MOC staff despite being in a situation requiring 
close cross coordination with other staff in the MOC. In line with the theme of this year’s 
symposium – The Evolution of C2 – this paper describes an experiment conducted to gain 
insight into the advantages and disadvantages associated with forming an OPT.  
 
Hocevar and Owen (1998) identified critical issues that must be managed to achieve the desired 
outcomes associated with IPTs.  They describe organizational-level factors, group-level factors, 
and individual factors. The business literature on large-scale change articulates that organizations 
are complex open systems and as such change must simultaneously address structure, technology, 
human resources, and tasks (Galbraith, 1989; Nadler, 1981). While teams provide a mechanism to 
increase flexibility of performance in the context of increasing environmental turbulence 
(Hocevar & Owen, 1998), decisions regarding whether and how to structure teams need to 
consider potential limitations that can result from the new structure. Structural changes require 
analysis of tasks and interdependencies as well as determination of appropriate integration 
mechanisms (Hocevar & Owen, 1998). Processes must be analyzed to determine what sets of 
activities have to be integrated with each other to provide increased value. In line with the goal of 
developing a better understanding of the conditions when standing up an OPT may produce 
undesired side effects, we are investigating one factor associated with formation of an OPT, 




The objective of this experiment was to examine the potential problems that could arise when 
forming an OPT. The overarching research question seeks to understand how are emergent 
events best handled when resources must be shared among separate planning teams?  For 
example when an Operational Planning Team is formed. The current study was designed to 
examine the efficiency and planning performance of two alternative organizational structures: (1) 
Integrated – where planning teams plan with a real-time view of others’ resource planning and 
(2) Isolated – where planning teams operate in isolation, without the ability to directly view 
others’ resource planning. The first experimental hypothesis was that “integrated teams create 
more effective plans than isolated teams due to their real-time awareness that enhances the 
interdependent solution. Our second experimental hypothesis was that isolated team member 
experience high levels of workload than integrated team members because their lack of real-time 
planning status requires more frequent status related communication in addition to collaborative 
effort. Our third experimental hypothesis was that isolated team members communicate more 
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frequently in response to emergent events because isolated team members must communicate to 
learn how others alter plans in response to unexpected events. 
 
Some MOCs form an OPT when a new crisis arises or a new unanticipated task needs to be 
accomplished. In these situations, some MOCs form an OPT, others do not. It has been observed 
during the Naval Staff Officers Course, that some OPTs tend to work in isolation, which can 
cause problems if their plans overlap – either in terms of the assets needed or operations – with 
the plans of the main body of the MOC. Our goal was to gain insight into performance differ-
ences for teams planning within a MOC where they planned with a sub-team of the MOC that 
either had full access to other planners’ information, i.e., they were fully integrated, or the sub-
team was isolated from the MOC. The isolated case was meant to serve as a surrogate for an 
OPT. The specific task entailed assigning resources to tasks and monitoring the effectiveness of 
task accomplishment and then replanning for the next day based on performance at the end of 
each day.  
 
An experiment was conducted where the MOC planned in the condition where either the FOPS 
team (1) was supported by a decision aid/ planning tool that fosters coordination across planners 
or (2) planned with a planning tool with a reduced coordination capability. These FOPS planners 
were all planning for use of the same resources and all planning for mission task accomplishment 
at the same time, which was likely to cause conflict regarding asset availability when multiple 
people request the same Task Force to perform tasks. We hypothesized if the planners did not 
collaborate to coordinate asset assignments problems would arise.   
 
Participants   
Twenty-four students in the Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences, at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, served as experimental participants during a 
ten-hour experiment conducted 1-12 March 2010. Their mean age was 33.4 years; services 
represented were Navy, 17, Marine Corps, 6, and Army, 1. Participants’ rank ranged from 0-2 
to 0-6. Six teams of four players participated in the experiment where each team consisted of 
four Future Operations (FOPS) players in line with the emphasis on planning at the operational 
level of war – the focus for Maritime Operations Centers.  
 
Planning Task   
Planning for the area of responsibility was divided among the four FOPS players. A player was 
responsible for planning in either Area A or Area B and was also responsible for planning for 
either the next day or two days into the future. This divided the planning tasks to make each 
person’s task manageable. It also resembles the way planning is accomplished in a MOC, where 
the FOPS team segments plans for various plan phases. Each team was assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions: (1) the FOPS team members, when convened, had access to a planning 
tool that displayed planning progress on all tasks by all planners or (2) FOPS team members had 
a limited version of the planning tool that did not display planning progress for other planners.  
 
A confederate played the role of a COPS member to simulate the exchange of information that 
occurs between COPS and FOPS. The COPS player sent situation reports (SITREPS) and 
casualty reports (CASREPS) via Chat over the course of the two-hour blocks to provide updates 
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on execution of the plan. Information in these SITREPS and CASREPS had to be considered by 
the FOPS planners as it impacted the planning process.  
 
Outline of Events 
The experiment was conducted in four time blocks, spread over several days.  Block 0 consisted 
of an introduction to the experiment, including a brief on the mission, and initial training and 
practice on their responsibilities. Following this, FOPS players were trained in their role as 
planners, practiced using their respective planning and monitoring tools, and communicating via 
Chat. 
 
Block 1 comprised the first 2-hour set of the experimental task which began in Phase 1 (where 
time = today) with a pre-determined (i.e., “yesterday’s”) FOPS plan implemented in the 
distributed dynamic decisionmaking (DDD) simulation. The DDD is a simulation tool that was 
used to display locations of assets. The goal during Block 1 was to plan for Blocks 2 and 3. The 
plan for Block 3 was modified in Block 2 as well. FOPS obtained updated information from 
COPS throughout the experiment and planned for the next two Blocks. The FOPS planning 
update was briefed to the MOC Director and submitted as a new plan at the end of Block 1. The 
plan for Block 2 was implemented at the tactical level in DDD at the beginning of Block 2. 
 
Block 2 was the second 2-hour set of the experimental task. Note: Block 2 began with the 
implementation of the FOPS participants’ plan produced in Block 1. FOPS planned for Blocks 3 
and 4. The plan for Block 4 was modified in Block 3 as well. At the beginning of Block 2, an 
emergent threat was announced such that the MOC would be assuming responsibility for a 
second area of tasks, with no increase in resources to handle the load.  
 
Block 3 comprised the third 2-hour set of the experimental task. The most recent Block 3 plans 
from FOPS were implemented to begin Block 3. FOPS planned for Blocks 4 and 5. Block 5 
plans were not implemented in this experiment. A briefing with the MOC Director was held at 
the end of Block 3. 
 
Block 4 was the fourth 2-hour set of the experimental task. The most recent Block 4 plans from 
FOPS were implemented to begin Block 4.  
 
Commander’s Update Briefings: The MOC Director (played by an experimenter) presented the 
Commander’s Update Briefing at the beginning of each experimental session where he reviewed 
the scenario, including the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) – the arrival schedule 
of forces into theater, and the task graph. Figure 1 presents a sample task graph used for the 
Commander’s update brief where days correspond to blocks. Commander’s guidance for task 
execution was given to indicate task priorities and key prerequisites for day T+1 (i.e., tomorrow) 




















































Figure 1.  Sample Task Graph used for Commander’s Update Brief. 
 
Measures 
Measures included performance-focused measures, measures of perceived workload, information 
need and availability, team process, and communication effectiveness. We report on several of 
these measures here. Additional analysis is ongoing and will be included in the presentation. 
 
Experimental Design 
Decision-aid tool availability was manipulated as our primary independent variable as the 
objective for this research is to gain insight into the advantages and limitations associated with 
integrated versus isolated planners. Decision-aid tool availability had two levels: (1) whether the 
FOPS team conducted planning using the full FOPS tool – where players could see planning 
progress on others’ tasks, or (2) a reduced FOPS tool was used which did not facilitate 
coordination across planners, that is, the planner could only see his/her own tasks. In the 
reduced-tool condition, when planners submitted their plan to the subordinate task forces, via the 
agent included in the tool, the agent informed the planner of the asset-to-task mapping it would 
recommend, and indicated whether its earlier recommendations to other planners included those 
same assets. This condition subsequently required communication between planners to resolve 
asset-to-task conflicts before submitting a joint plan). [Note, the FOPS planning tool and the 
intelligent agent are described in the next section.]   
 
Materials and Scenario  
A number of scenario injects were crafted in the form of casualty reports (CASREPS) and 
situation reports (SITREPS) to cause changes regarding the planning tasks over the four time 
blocks. These included changes in asset availability that occurred over the course of the scenario 
to reflect real-world situations, e.g., a catapult on the carrier goes down, an aircraft system incurs 
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a problem, or a missile launcher is temporarily reduced to 50% capability. All information 
arrived on an a-periodic basis, at various time intervals.  
 
Updates were sent by COPS (played by a confederate, or the white cell) and passed to FOPS 
regarding the following: (1) performance on individual tasks (accuracy and percentage 
completed) for that day and (2) reports on asset capabilities, such as, when systems were back up 
to full capability.  
 
Future Operations (FOPS) Planning Task   
FOPS planners were charged with translating the mission and selecting a course of action (COA) 
to instantiate a plan for that mission. They considered available forces, to request support for 
execution of the mission tasks for which they were responsible (from subordinate task forces 
either as the primary task force responsible for execution of the task, or as in a secondary role as 
a supporting task force). Then they determined how they could meet their planning needs within 
the next 24 hours, and 48 hours, and assigned task forces as either primary or supporting for the 
given tasks.  FOPS also monitored the information received in the CASREPS and SITREPS to 
ascertain the implications of this new information.  
 
FOPS Planning Tool   
A planning tool developed to facilitate the planning process was provided to all four FOPS 
players. Our MOC-2010 experiment utilized analytical models in a relatively new and expanded 
manner by embedding analytical models within an on-line decision aid for asset allocation and 
planning. This decision-aid module was developed and implemented by the University of 
Connecticut (Mandal, Han, Pattipati, & Kleinman, 2010; Han, Mandal, Bui, Martinez, Sidoti, 
Pattipati, & Kleinman, 2010). This work presents a step forward in the design of decision aids 
(and agents) for human-in-the-loop planning activities.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the modeling formalism used to match tasks to assets. This was accomplished by 
quantifying the amount of warfare capabilities required to accomplish each of the tasks in the 
scenario and quantifying the amount of warfighting capability provided by each Task Force. For 
example, in Figure 2 we see conducting Task T1, air early warning (AEW) in Area A, requires 5 
units each of C2, air warfare, and ISR-air, and 4 units of ISR-ground capability. Similarly, the 
amount of each of the warfighting capabilities provided by each Task Force is specified. (These 
values were obtained through discussions with subject matter experts.) FOPS planners assigned 
each task to a Task Force, and also specified performance goals and priorities for accomplishing 
each task. These requirements were then “submitted” to the subordinate Task Forces by entering 
them into the tool. The Task Forces then determined, via the agent, how best to utilize their assets 
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C2 STRK AW BMD CMD SUW USW MIW ISR_a ISR_s ISR_g BDA
CVN-1 6 6 5 2 6 2 1 4 6 2 6
CG-1  3 4 8 7 6 4 4 3 6 5
DDG-1 2 5 8 7 6 4 3 3 6 4
DDG-2 2 5 8 7 6 4 3 3 6 4
FFG-1 1 1 4 2 2 4 3 2 4
Total TF-A 14 21 33 21 22 20 16 13 24 23 2 6
• FOPS ASSIGNS EACH TASK TO A TF, with PERFORMANCE GOALS and PRIORITIES





Figure 2.  Modeling Formalism: Matching Tasks to Assets. 
 
The FOPS planning tool is an interactive computer-based tool that provides the ability for the 
planner to assign mission tasks to subordinate task forces. Players were given a set of constraints 
they needed to consider during the planning process. These constraints included the following: 
(1) no subordinate task force (STF) can have primary responsibility for more than four 
concurrent tasks, (2) a STF can have a supporting role for no more than two concurrent tasks, 
and (3) there can be no more than two supporting TFs on any given task. Once a FOPS planner 
had designated STFs, as either supported (primary) or supporting (secondary) for all tasks for 
which he/she was assigned responsibility, the plan was “submitted.” An agent-based Task Force 
algorithm was then run to determine assignments based on the expected performance levels 
designated by the FOPS players for all tasks, similar to the way planning is conducted at the 
operational level of war.  
 
Additional details of the FOPS planning tool are described in Appendix A. Figure 3 depicts the 
Summary screen that is one of several displays included in the FOPS planning tool. All known 
tasks are shown on this Summary screen, including those that have ended or are not yet doable or 
begun. Those tasks that are not relevant for that day are shaded out.  It was known a priori when 
tasks would begin and (nominally) when they would end. The Summary screen provides 
functionality for the following processes: (1) submitting a preliminary plan to the subordinate 
Task Forces (TFs) for their review; (2) finalizing the plan that will be briefed to the MOC 
commander at the end of the day; and (3) alerting a FOPS player when new (asset) information 






Finalizing the plan. Finalize means to send out the actual operational orders to the TFs. Finalize 
is only valid for day T+1 and T+2 and was done by FOPS only at the end of the lab session. The 
plan for today (day T) is already being executed, and so no changes were allowed by FOPS.  
 
Alerting a FOPS planner when new information has arrived. When any asset parameters 
have changed, COPS pushed information to FOPS planners via CHAT. The FOPS planner used 
the Asset Status screen to import this new information on assets. When asset capabilities had 
changed, the results that have been provided by the agent models may no longer be valid. Thus, 
the players needed to resubmit the plan to the TFs for adjustment, taking into account the 
changed asset capabilities.   
 
Assignment Screen. The Assignment screen, depicted in Figure 4, is the main screen that 
individual planners used to perform their job of assigning tasks to primary and supporting TFs on 
specific days (T+1 and T+2).  Tasks were assigned one at a time.  In using this screen the 
relevant task was first selected via a drop-down list, where only the relevant tasks for the day in 
question were on this list. (A user could also reach this screen by clicking the Task-ID button on 
the Summary screen wherein the selected task would be brought up directly.)  Associated with 
the selected task is shown the (fixed/ given) task priority, and the decision maker (DM) 
responsible for planning that task on the relevant day. The desired performance goal/target for 
the day is input/changed by the players via a drop-down list.  The Expected by TFs performance 
numbers is provided via the TF agent models only after an overall plan has been submitted  to the 
TFs for review (via the Summary screen).  
 
Assigning a task involves: (a) selecting a primary TF, and (b) selecting up to two supporting TFs 
– each one possibly supporting in up to two warfare areas. Selecting a primary TF is via a radio 
button, so that there can only be a single primary TF. A primary TF can apply any or all of its 
warfare capabilities to the task, depending on the allocation decisions reached by the agent 
models.  Any TF not designated as primary can be a supporting TF.  The selection of up to 2 
supporting warfare areas per supporting TF is via a drop-down list that contains all of the 




Figure 3.  Summary Screen in FOPS Planning Tool. 
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The Total capabilities lines present the following, by warfare area: Possibly (potentially) applic-
able is the total of (1) all capabilities in the Available for this task line for the primary TF, plus 
(2) all capabilities in the selected warfare areas for every supporting TF as given in their  
Available for this task line.  Clearly this is an optimistic assessment as it does not consider other 
DMs’ actions. 
 
These numbers change on-line as the DM makes changes to the task assignment. Last Allocation 
by TFs is the amount of different resource capabilities that the agent models last assigned to this 
task, across all TFs.  These numbers will only change after a new plan is sent to the TFs for 
review. Shortage is the difference between the Last Allocation by TFs line and the Estimated task 
requirements line. 
 
There are a number of constraints that must be satisfied in the overall task-to-TF assignments. 
These constraints require DMs to collaborate in their distributed task planning and assignment 
actions include the following: (1) a TF cannot be primary on more than three tasks on a given 
day; (2) a DM cannot select any supporting TFs on a task until a primary TF has been selected;  
(3) a TF cannot be supporting on more than three tasks on a given day; (4) there can be no more 
than two supporting TFs on any given task; and (5) some primary assignments of a TF are fixed 
and cannot be changed:  a) for T+1 any task that had been assigned in the prior day’s T+2.  b) for 
T+2 any task that is still ongoing from the previous day – i.e., if a TF was primary on day n it 
must continue to be prime on day n+1.  Basically, primary assignments once made on a task 
cannot be changed.  But any supporting assignment can be changed as needed. 
 
The tool checked and verified (using information as currently posted on the Summary page) that 
all constraints as noted above were satisfied and then placed the new task assignment 
(performance goals, supported-supporting relations) into the table on the Summary page.  If some 












Each of six teams engaged in four (4) two-hour sessions (i.e., blocks) of the experiment, 
discussed here in relation to the fictional days of the experimental scenario (i.e., Days 0, 1, 2, and 
3). Days 0 and 1 consisted of training the participants to use the operational-level planning 
software with guidance from experimenters. Days 2 and 3, considered the performance periods, 
provided greater autonomy to participants in their efforts to develop plans for Future Operations 
(FOPS). The experimental goals in these two performance periods were to investigate 
differences in plan quality (performance), workload, and communication between experimental 
conditions that differ with regard to shared situation awareness.  
 
Teams in the integrated condition used planning software that enabled full situation awareness 
regarding the assignment of task forces (TFs) to tasks in both primary and supporting roles. 
While each of the four team members who was responsible for a unique set of tasks in a specific 
planning area (Area A or B) during a specific timeframe [Time T+1 (tomorrow), or T+2 (day 
after tomorrow)], all members in this integrated condition were cognizant of the current planning 
allocations by everyone within the team.   
 
In contrast, teams in the isolated condition used a limited form of this planning software, in 
which situation awareness was limited to only those tasks for which the individual team member 
is responsible. Thus, the task force allocation information readily available to integrated team 
members is not visibly available to isolated team members, and must be obtained through 
computer chat-based communication.  Results from between-condition analyses are described 
throughout the remainder of this section.  
 
Performance 
Performance in this experiment was defined as the quality of the plan produced by participants in 
the role of Future Operations (FOPS) planners. Four specific plans were submitted at the end of 
each two-hour performance period: plans for timeframes T+1 and T+2 in both Areas A and B. 
Measures of planning quality, or performance, were calculated as the average weighted score for 
each task (across Areas A and B, within a specified timeframe – either T+1 or T+2). Task scores 
contain the ratio of expected plan quality levels (either accuracy or percent complete) to those 
values requested by Commander’s Intent, and weighted by the priority of the task in relation to 
other tasks (2 = low priority; 10 = high priority).  
 
It was expected that teams in the integrated condition would produce higher quality plans than 
the isolated condition due to the enhanced shared situation awareness provided by the planning 
software.  Results from a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) supported this 
hypothesis (see Figure 5), as the quality of plans provided by the integrated teams (M = 
106.75, SE = .73) was significantly greater than plans developed by teams in the isolated 






Figure 5.  Average performance between conditions across the two final  
performance periods. 
 
Additional ANOVA analyses indicate that this significant pattern of differences between 
conditions exists with T+1 (tomorrow) planners [F(1, 10) = 6.95, p < .03], but only a marginal 
difference exists among T+2 (day after tomorrow) planners [F(1, 10) = 3.40, p < .10]. While the 
integrated teams scored consistently higher than isolated teams for both T+1 and T+2 planners 
(see Figure 6), there was a greater degree of variance among T+2 planners (M = 107.17, SE = 




Figure 6.  Average performance between conditions for T+1 and T+2 planners. 
 
Workload 
Workload was assessed using an adapted version of the TLX Workload Scale (Hart & Staveland, 
1988), in which workload is measured on a self-report 10-point continuous rating scale in each of 
five distinct dimensions: mental, time pressure, performance, effort, and frustration. This 
measure was issued at the close of each experimental session (four times per team), and 
demonstrated sufficient internal consistency (α = .87). 
 
It was expected that workload would be greatest for teams in the isolated condition, as the lack of 
shared situation awareness provided by their planning tool necessitates an increase in the amount 
of explicit (communication-based) status updates and coordination required to succeed on this 
interdependent task. Workload was also expected to increase as the experiment progressed from 
Days 0-3, as injects that limit one’s available resources increased in complexity over time. 
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As expected, results of a condition (2; Integrated vs. Isolated) by session (4; Days 0-3) between-
within-subjects ANOVA (see Figure 7) indicate that the average overall workload reported by 
isolated team members (M = 42.89, SE = 3.75) was significantly greater than workload reported 
by integrated team members (M = 33.69, SE = 3.75) across all four experimental sessions (F(1, 




Figure 7. Average workload scores between conditions across all experimental sessions. 
 
Workload was also compared between integrated and isolated conditions in a one-way between-
subjects ANOVA, showing similar significant support for increased workload in the isolated 
condition [F(1, 94) = 5.61, p < .03]. Results of a MANOVA comparing conditions across the five 
dimensions of workload showed a significant difference between conditions [Wilks' Lambda = 
0.167, F(5, 90) = 90.01, p < .001]. Subsequent univariate analyses showed the workload ratings 
of mental pressure, performance, and effort to each be significantly greater for isolated team 
members (p < .01).  
 
Results also supported the hypothesized increase in workload as the experiment progressed (see 
Figure 8).  Specifically, workload ratings provided on session Day 0 (M = 29.08, SE = 2.48), Day 
1 (M = 36.21, SE = 3.63), Day 2 (M = 41.52, SE = 3.67), and Day 3 (M = 46.37, SE = 4.85) were 




Figure 8. Linear increase in workload throughout subsequent days of the experiment. 
 
In addition to the main effect for session shown above, isolated teams reported greater workload 
than integrated teams in each block (see Figure 9). Combined with the findings noted above, 
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these results suggest that as the scenario builds and the interdependence between task areas A 
and B becomes more complex, integrated team members perceive less mental workload and 
demonstrate more effective performance than isolated team members.  Thus, providing 
additional status-related situation awareness can increase planning performance and decrease 





Figure 9. Greater workload for isolated vs. integrated team members. 
 
Communication 
All Chat messages sent during an experimental session were captured electronically. To analyze 
the chat the chat-file for each experimental session was printed to expedite coding. First all 
acknowledgement messages (e.g., roger, solid copy, confirm) were removed. The primary metric 
was the percent of collaborating messages to total messages sent. Percent collaborating messages 
was analyzed using a Condition X Days between-within-subjects ANOVA. As we can see from 
Figure 10, the percent of collaborative messages to all messages increases almost linearly from 
day 1 to day 3 for the teams in the isolated condition, whereas the percent collaborative messages 
for the teams in the integrated condition falls below the isolated level by day two and remains 
below the isolated level on day 3. This interaction was significant, F(2, 8) = 4.36, p <= .05. It 
would appear that the need to discuss the collaborative effort increases constantly for those in the 
isolated condition. But, for those in the integrated condition once they establish collaborative 




Figure 10.  Percentage of collaborative chat messages by condition and day. 
 




APPENDIX A:  Details of the FOPS Planning Tool 
 
Summary Screen   
The Summary screen shows the task assignment actions of all co-acting and interacting players 
on a task-by-task basis. It was used by FOPS to iterate a plan with the (subordinate) Task Forces 
for either day T+1 (today plus 1 day) or T+2, and then to finalize the plan. [Note: FOPS used the 
Assignment screen for the actual planning of asset allocation for all tasks.] 
 
The columns on the Summary screen for each task will be described from left to right. ID number 
(e.g., TA01) – this button, when clicked, will take the decision maker to the Assignment screen 
for that task for the particular day in question, including day T. Task is the name of the task the 
information on this row describes. Priority is the priority assigned to the task, ostensibly by 
elements external to FOPS (that is, the battlegroup commander). Decision Maker (DM) is the 
FOPS DM who is responsible for planning the task (set by the experimenters).  Note that any one 
FOPS DM only had responsibility for a subset of the overall tasks, and this could vary from day 
to day. Primary TF is the unique primary Task Force assigned to conduct the task.  Supporting 
TF is where the FOPS planner designates up to two supporting Task Forces for that task along 
with specifying those warfare areas in which they are to provide support. 
 
Criteria refers to the desired performance criteria associated with this task, which is specified 
either in terms of accuracy/ coverage desired or percentage of task complete at the end of the 
day.  Typically, a task that persists would have an accuracy or percent coverage assigned with it, 
such as having enough aircraft up to cover 75% of the area of operations for a surface 
surveillance task. The task-specific criterion is fixed in the scenario, i.e., whether accuracy/ 
coverage or percent complete at day’s end is the correct criterion for a given task. Desired 
Performance specifies performance desired for this task by FOPS in terms of either accuracy or 
percent complete. (These numbers are entered via the Assignment page.)  Expected Performance 
is the expected accuracy or percent complete which is calculated by the Task Force intelligent 
agent. The Task Force agent models provided these numbers once the overall plan had been 
submitted to the TFs for review.   
Actual performance is relevant only for day T (i.e., today), in that this provides feedback to all 
players on the actual performance on the task. This information came via COPS, who passed 
information to FOPS, in the form of SITREPS that informed FOPS on execution of the mission. 
Confirm Assignment – Since different FOPS players had responsibility for planning separate 
subsets of the overall tasks, this checkbox was used to synchronize player’s actions before the 
composite plan was submitted to the TFs. If any change was made to the task assignment (as 
saved via the assignment page) this box became unchecked.  Only the DM responsible for the 
task could check this box.  Before a plan could be submitted to the TFs or finalized, all confirm 
boxes must be checked.   
 
Submitting the plan developed by FOPS to subordinate Task Forces (TFs) for their review means 
to “ask” the TFs how they would instantiate the composite plan.  This instantiation was done by 
the agent models. All relevant tasks for the day in question had to have a primary TF designated 
(in the Prime STF column), with a priority greater than zero, and a desired performance number 
in order to be included in the plan. The (new or revised) performance numbers in the expected 
column were returned from the agent model. These performance numbers were calculated for 
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expected accuracy for tasks having “infinite” duration, or expected percentage completion for 
tasks having finite time duration.  Submitting the plan is like a pushing a “what if” button to see 




If any change was made to any task within the overall plan (including priority, desired 
performance, expected performance, etc.), the plan had to be resubmitted to the TFs.  Players had 
indications when a change was made to a task assignment via: a) the confirm box for that task 
became unchecked and b) the expected performance for that task showed “??”.  If Submit had 
been clicked, further clicking of this button (as well as the Save button on the Assignment 
screen) for the particular day was disabled until the agent algorithms finished and returned their 
results, or a minimum (fixed) time has passed. 
 
Task Force Agent Modal Processing   
Agent algorithms were designed to represent the TF planning cells at each TF level for each TF. 
A vector contains information on what the task needs based on the latest intelligence and when 
the COPS player receives new intelligence he/she will provide updates to this list of task 
requirements based on these inputs. This list of task requirements provides the best information 
available to planners on what is needed to accomplish the tasks.  Based on the assumption that 
the individual TFs are coordinating with each other, the agent receives the plan as submitted by 
the FOPS players in the MOC regarding primary and secondary assignments of TFs to specified 
mission tasks. The agent algorithm determines how to best assign individual assets (such a CG-1, 
UAV-4, aircraft-6) in order to best meet desired performance levels specified by the MOC.  This 
is accomplished by minimizing differences between task accuracy (or performance completed) 
as a ratio of applied resource capability to the estimated task resource requirements. The 
algorithm minimizes the difference between what is thought to be needed to accomplish the task 
and desired performance as a weighted sum of overall tasks, where weight equals the priority 
assigned to each task.  
 
A vector is produced to show how much capability will be provided by the primary TF and the 
supporting TFs to each task. This vector is presented to the FOPS players to show which 
individual assets within each TF are assigned to which task and how much of that asset’s 
capability is available for a given task. This includes how much a primary TF provides to each 
task (a primary TF can support up to four tasks at any time) and how much a secondary TF 
provides to each task.  Agents do not override what was designated by FOPS planners; they 
merely make decisions about which of the assets to apply to each task. For example, DDG-1 will 
use two units of C2 on task x, and two units of C2 on task y. (Note: FOPS does not receive this 
level of detail when the agent presents the results to the FOPS planners. But this information is 
sent to the DDD so it can show which assets have been assigned to which TF.)  
 
Assignment Screen 
The resource vectors shown (across task and TF warfare areas) are the following: The Estimated 
task requirements is the current “best guess” as provided via intelligence or COPS regarding the 
capabilities that must be brought to bear on the task in order to achieve the desired performance 
goal.  These numbers were calculated by the software from stored task values for each play 





the FOPS planner makes changes to the desired performance goals, e.g., if a player increases the 
desired percent complete by end of day (or increases the desired accuracy) for that task. 
 
For each specific TF, the Total capabilities numbers are taken directly from the summation line 
on the Asset Status page.  Thus, it behooves the players to continually update their local TF 
capability data.  The Available for this task line is the previous line less all resource allocations – 
as last made by the TF agents – to tasks other than the currently selected task.  If no composite 
plan has ever been sent to the TFs for review (via the Summary page) then this line will equal the 
total line.  An “x” in a resource category means that the particular TF is out of range for applying 
that resource (warfare area) to the selected task.   
 
The Allocated by TFs line shows the amount of resource capability that the TF agents last 
allocated to the task.  Nominally these numbers will approximate the prior line in those warfare 
areas relevant (≠ 0) to the selected task.   If no composite plan has yet been sent to the TFs for 
review all entries will be “??”.  Also, if the DM made any change in the assignment of the task to 
TF-X this line will either show all “??” or be shaded out. 
 
The Task prerequisite Status button is only needed for days T+1 and T+2 – and only for those 
tasks that are scheduled to begin on the day in question. When clicked it pops up a window that 
lists, on a line-by-line basis, all of the prerequisites for the selected task.  A given line shows: a) 
the required prerequisite performance criterion (in percentage), and b) the (actual or expected) 
performance numbers for the prior day.  Thus, for tasks starting on day T+ 1 we show the actual 
performance of the prerequisite as pulled from the Summary page (if no entry exists yet use the 
estimated performance value and display in italic).  For tasks starting on day T+2 we show the 
estimated performance from the day T+1 Summary page.  If that value is “??” we show “TBD” 
in the pop up window.  If a task has no prerequisites, or is not scheduled to begin on eitherT+1 or 
T+2, the button is shaded out.  The user must close the pop-up window before any other actions 
can be taken. 
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